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Abstract Continuously changing nature of technological environment has been
enforcing to revise the process of information security risk analysis accordingly. A
number of quantitative and qualitative risk analysis methods have been proposed
by researchers and vendors. The purpose of these methods is to analyze today’s
information security risks properly. Some of these methods are supported by
a software package. In this study, a survey based quantitative approach is proposed
to analyze security risks of information technologies by taking current necessities
into consideration. The new method is named as Information Security Risk Analysis
Method (ISRAM). Case study has shown that ISRAM yields consistent results in
a reasonable time period by allowing the participation of the manager and staff of
the organization.
ª 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The structure and type of information technologies
have changed enormously over last decade. The
simple stand-alone batch applications evolved into
distributedcomputing environments, including real-
time control, multitasking and distributed process-
ing. The process of information security risk analysis
has also been affected by these enormous changes.
It is claimed to be ‘‘inconsistent, long lasting and
difficult to apply’’ (Gerber and Solms, 2001). Due to
the difficulties of applying complex risk analysis
tools into today’s information systems, researchers
have studied to develop new methods.
Because the success and continuity of organ-
izations vastly depend on the availability of infor-
mation technologies, the task of protection of
information technologies have become more crit-
ical than ever. In 1980s, the head of information
technologies (IT) department of organization was
the responsible staff to protect information sys-
tems. Nowadays, some of the company managers
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are taking over this responsibility from the head of
IT department (Owens, 1998). Thus, managers of
organizations should understand the risk analysis
process that directly affects the protection of
information technologies. Moreover, managers
may desire to participate in risk analysis process.
The structure of new risk analysis methods allows
the participation of managers (Bilbao, 1992; Kailey
and Jarratt, 1995; Jenkins, 1998; C&A Systems
Security Limited, 2000; Toval et al., 2002; Jacobson,
2002; Coles and Moulton, 2003).
In this study, a new method named Information
Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM) is proposed
for information security risk analysis by taking
today’s needs into account. ISRAM is designed for
analyzing the risks at complex information systems
by allowing the participation of managers and
staff. Proposed method consists of seven steps.
These steps are exemplified in a case study in
order to explain ISRAM clearly. To verify the results
of the same case study, a risk model is set up with
Arena simulation software. The collected real-life
statistical data are introduced into the risk model.
This paper is organized as follows: risk analysis
methods for information security are introduced
briefly after the Introduction. Then the risk model
of ISRAM, explanations and experimental results
are presented. The section following that contains
some ideas on the verification, comparison and the
results of the application. The last section is the
conclusion.
Risk analysis methods for information
security
Basically there are two types of risk analysis
methods. Quantitative risk analysis methods use
mathematical and statistical tools to represent
risk. In qualitative risk analysis methods, risk is
analyzed with the help of adjectives instead of
using mathematics. Risk analysis methods that use
intensive quantitative measures are not suitable
for today’s information security risk analysis. In
contrast to the past decades, today’s information
systems have a complicated structure and a wide-
spread use. Therefore, intensive mathematical
measures used to model risk for complex environ-
ments make the process more difficult. Calcula-
tions performed during the risk analysis process
are also very complex. Quantitative methods may
not be able to model today’s complex risk scenar-
ios. Risk analysis methods based on qualitative
measures, are more suitable for today’s complex
risk environment of information systems. However,
one important drawback for qualitative risk anal-
ysis methods is their nature that yields inconsis-
tent results. Because qualitative methods do not
use tools like mathematics and statistics to model
the risk, the result of method is vastly depended
on the ideas of people who conduct the risk
analysis. There is a risk of giving subjective results
while using qualitative risk analysis methods.
Following examples can be given for two types of
risk analysis tools which are based on quantitative
and qualitative methods. TUAR is a quantitative
tool, which uses fault trees and fuzzy logic to
express the risk (Bilbao, 1992). RaMEX is a qualita-
tive tool, which does not use mathematical or
statistical instruments (Kailey and Jarratt, 1995).
Both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis
methods may be supported by software. On the
contrary, risk analysis methods that are executed
without assistance of software are referred as
paper-based methods (Gordon, 1992). There are
a number of risk analysis methods that are sup-
ported by software (Spinellis et al., 1999). Soft-
ware-based risk analysis methods may have some
disadvantages. First, the cost of such methods is
usually high. Second, the main frame of risk
analysis process is drawn by software. Thus, some
necessary variations of the risk analysis process
would not be achieved. Paper-based risk analysis
methods consist of meetings, discussions and work-
ing sheets. One important drawback for paper-
based method is their duration. Because of the
nature of the meetings, paper-based methods may
take a long time to give the risk results.
The Buddy System (Jenkins, 1998) and Cobra
(C&A Systems Security Limited, 2000) are examples
of risk analysis methods that are supported by
software. The Buddy System is quantitative, and
Cobra is qualitative. SPRINT is an example of
paper-based risk analysis method (ISF, 1997).
Both quantitative and qualitative risk analysis
methods may be supported by standards and
guides like Common Criteria Framework (ISO,
1999), ISO 13335 (ISO, 1996e2001), ISO 17799
(ISO, 2000), NIST 800-30 Special Publication (NIST,
2001) and the other standards and guides related
to information technologies (Toval et al., 2002). As
an example, CRAMM (CCTA, 2001) is a quantitative,
software-based risk analysis method that is com-
patible with standards. CORA is another risk
analysis tool, which is quantitative, software
based and compatible with NIST 800-30 guide
(Jacobson, 2002). A risk manager can use CORA
to perform risk analysis process described in NIST
800-30 guide. These standards put forward robust
and well-defined risk analysis methods. However,
these methods may require the participation of
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expert risk analysts because of complexity and
formality of methods.
BPIRM, business process information risk man-
agement, is an approach for risk management,
which is suggested to close the major gaps found at
some risk management practices conducted by
organizations (Coles and Moulton, 2003). Under-
standing the real risks by the business process
owner and defining their control requirements are
recommended by the method of BPRIM. Also this
method is useful for establishing who is responsible
for implementing and managing the controls re-
lated to these risks throughout all aspects of the
business process.
The driving force for changes to information
security risk analysis is not just the technology.
Information security risk analysis has been affected
by the new legal requirements. Therefore, risk
management is required novel governance ap-
proaches. To overcome this issue, a governance
approach is proposed to provide a better frame-
work to manage risks (Moulton and Coles, 2003).
ISRAM: information security risk
analysis method
By taking today’s information technology environ-
ment into consideration, risk analysis method
should allow effective participation of manager
and staff into the process. In today’s technological
environment, if the risk analysis method contains
complicated mathematical and statistical tools, it
may require the expert participation and it may
last for a long time. Also, the risk analysis process
should not contain pure qualitative measures. This
may cause subjective results. Risk analysis meth-
ods that do not possess these properties may not
meet the requirements of organizations. ISRAM is
a quantitative, paper-based risk analysis method
that is designed to have these properties.
Risk model of ISRAM
The underlying risk model of ISRAM is based on the
following formula, which is the fundamental risk
formula (NIST, 2001; McEvoy and Whitcombe,
2002; USGAO, 1999).
RiskZProbability of occurrence of security breach
!Consequence of occurrence of security breach
ð1Þ
The risk model of ISRAM, which is deduced from
formula (1), is given by formula (2). Formula (2)
consists of two main parts, which are the projec-





















i: the number of questions for the survey of pro-
bability of occurrence, determined at Step-2;
j: the number of questions for the survey of
consequences of occurrence, determined at
Step-2;
m: the number of participants who participated
in the survey of probability of occurrence,
becomes definite at Step-5;
n: the number of participants who participated
in the survey of consequences of occurrence,
becomes definite at Step-5;
wi, wj: weight of the question ‘‘i’’ (‘‘j’’),
determined at Step-2;
pi, pj: numerical value of the selected answer
choice for question ‘‘i’’ (‘‘j’’), determined at
Step-3;
T1: risk table for the survey of probability of
occurrence, constructed at Step-4;
T2: risk table for the survey of consequences of
occurrence, constructed at Stepe4;
Risk: single numeric value for representing the
risk. Obtained at Stepe6.
ISRAM is basically a survey preparation and
conduction process to assess the security risk in
an organization. Two separate and independent
survey processes are being conducted for two risk
parameters in formula (2). The preparation and
conduction of survey, so as the analysis of its
results are defined according to the well-defined
steps to yield the risk. Formula (2) represents
these steps mathematically.
Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) value may be
required for some company managers after risk
analysis. ISRAM does not make Single Loss Expec-
tancy (SLE) or ALE calculations during the calcula-
tion of ‘‘risk’’. The unit of ‘‘risk’’ is not in dollars.
Rather, it is a single numerical value between 1
and 25, which will be defined later in Table 9.
However, while presenting the survey result to
senior management, the risk value may be con-
verted to an ALE value by the risk analyst. ISRAM
supports an easy conversion from the risk value to
the ALE value. A sample conversion for the result
of case study is given in the section ‘Verification,
comparison and the results of the application’.
Information security risk analysis method 149
The method in detail
The aim of ISRAM is to assess the risk caused by the
information security problems. To achieve this
goal, ISRAM is performed by using public opinion
on the problem. Public opinion is obtained by
conducting a survey. A survey is composed of
questions and answer choices related to the infor-
mation security problem. Manager, directors, tech-
nical personal and common users of computer may
be candidates for answering the survey questions.
The aim of the survey is to understand the effect
of information security problem on the system or
organization. In other words, conducting a survey
is somewhat making an as-is analysis. ISRAM makes
a structured as-is analysis to assess the risk caused
by information security problem.
ISRAM consists of seven main steps as shown in
Fig. 1. Of these seven steps, first four steps belong
to the survey preparation phase, fifth step is the
conduction of the survey and the last two steps
are the phase in which results are obtained and
assessed. In the survey preparation phase of
ISRAM, the questions, the number of the questions,
the weight values of the questions, the number of
answer choices and the numerical values of answer
choices are determined. Finally, the risk tables are
prepared.
The existence of information security problem is
detected in the first step. After the first step,
ISRAM process is divided into two parallel sub-
processes. One of these sub-processes is performed
for the probability of occurrence of security breach
parameter and the other is performed for the
consequences of occurrence of security breach
parameter. Hereafter, only the sub-process for
the probability of occurrence of security breach
will be explained according to Fig. 1.
In the second step, all the factors that may
affect the probability of occurrence of security
breach are listed. After listing all possible factors
for the risk parameter, weight values are desig-
nated to the factors. One factor may have more
effect on the probability of the occurrence than
the other. That’s why weight values for factors are
designated. Weight values of the factors are in fact
weight values for the questions. (Factors are con-
verted into survey questions in the third step.)
Step-2 is a vital part of ISRAM to obtain the realistic
and objective results. To achieve this step, people
who have general security perspective and prefer-
ably company workers should participate in. These
staff should have enough knowledge and aware-
ness on the information security problem, its
effects and its probable causes. Also, staff should
have enough knowledge on the information system
that is affected by the problem.
In the third step, the factors are converted
into the survey questions and the answer choices
are determined for each question. Each question
may have different number of choices. The
number of choices should be selected by the risk
analyst according to the questions and the case
being analyzed. After the answer choices are
determined, numerical values are designated to
the answer choices. Because certain differentia-
tions have to be supplied among the answer
choices of a question. The answer choices and
their numerical values have to be selected care-
fully, because, the answers selected by survey
participants will be the main assessment compo-
nents for the risk. In Step-6, risk amount will be
calculated quantitatively according to the answer
choices selected by participants. The team who
lists the factors should work carefully on the
selection of the choices and assignment of
numerical values.
In the fourth step, two risk tables are prepared.
Risk tables are vital for the quantitative analysis of
the survey results. A risk table converts bulk surveyFigure 1 Basic flow diagram of ISRAM.
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result to meaningful, quantitative and scaled
values. To do this, a risk table scales all possible
survey results that can be obtained from a single
survey. Risk tables are the main reference points
for the evaluation of the survey results. They
prevent confusions while quantitatively assessing
the survey results. The content of a risk table
changes according to the surveys conducted. A risk
table forms a connection between the result of
survey and the quantitative value of the risk
parameter under consideration.
Survey is conducted after the preparation of risk
tables is over. This is the fifth step of ISRAM. This
step is the most peculiar part of ISRAM in which
ordinary information system users participate ac-
tively into the risk analysis process. At Step-5, the
survey questions can be distributed to the relevant
staff as hard copy or it can be answered electron-
ically. The questions for two risk parameters can
be delivered in one survey or it is possible to
deliver separate surveys for two risk parameters.
In this case, the number of participants may be
different for two surveys. It is important to note
that the answers to the survey questions are
valuable information for risk analysis process. But
the main purpose of ISRAM is to convert these
answers into numeric values.
In the sixth step, formula (2) is applied to get
single quantitative risk result from answered sur-
veys. An example of application of formula (2) is
given in Table 10, which shows the calculations for
our case study.
Step-7 is the assessment phase of ISRAM. In the
assessment phase, not only the numerical survey
result, which is obtained in Step-6, is assessed
but also the answers to the survey questions are
analyzed.
All of these phases allow the active participa-
tion of managers and staff into the risk analysis
process. Among these seven steps, addition, multi-
plication and division operations are used only in
Steps 4 and 6. Other complicated mathematical
and statistical calculations are not used in these
steps.
Steps 2e4 are the most vital parts of ISRAM for
an objective risk analysis. Company staff must
work carefully during these steps to vanish any
subjectivity and incompleteness.
Practice of ISRAM
In the case study, ISRAM was used to analyze the
risk arising from computer viruses. Our environ-
ment for risk analysis was composed of 20 com-
puters on a Local Area Network (LAN) as shown
in Fig. 2. These computers belong to a research
institute and are used by staff to connect to
Internet. Every computer has a dedicated user.
However, any of the computers in the network can
be used by any user. Twenty institute workers took
action in the survey to obtain the public opinion on
computer viruses.
Step-1: awareness of the problem
As it has been already said in the previous
paragraph, the information security problem is
caused by computer viruses. Computers which
are used in the case study do not have appropriate
antivirus software installed. Personal firewall
products are installed in a few computers. It is
apparent that there is a strong requirement for
a structured risk analysis in which the probability
of a virus infection and the consequences of an
incident is estimated.
Technically oriented people of the institute
realize the information security problem and de-
cide to make a risk analysis. The first step of ISRAM
is completed.
Figure 2 Environment of ISRAM.
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Step-2: listing and weighing the factors
At Step-2, separate analyses are made for two risk
parameters to determine the factors, which affect
these parameters.
After determining and listing all the factors,
weight values are assigned to the factors by using
Table 1. The value of assets, the strength of
already existing countermeasures, and the level
of vulnerabilities are all considered during the
assignment of weight factors.
After the discussions among risk analysis team, 21
factors are determined that affect the probability
of a virus infection. Fifteen factors are determined
that affect the consequences of infection. Among
these factors, six of them affect both parameters.
Three of the factors are directly associated with
vulnerabilities of operating system and patch level
(these three factors affect both risk parameters).
Some of the factors that affect the probability
of a virus infection and their equivalent weight
values are shown in Table 2. (Because of the space
constraints, all the factors could not be written.)
Some of the factors that affect the consequen-
ces of a virus infection and their equivalent weight
values are shown in Table 3.
Six factors that affect both the probability and
the consequences of a virus infection and their
equivalent weight values are shown in Table 4.
First three factors in Table 4 are directly
associated with vulnerabilities of systems. Note
that these factors affect both the probability and
the consequences of infection. These factors have
also considerable weight values.
Step-3: converting factors into questions,
designating answer choices and assigning
numerical values to answer choices
At Step-3, all the factors are converted into survey
questions and answer choices are designated. The
number of answer choices can change according to
the type and structure of survey question. In our
case study, there are a total number of 30 survey
questions. Ten of these questions have only two
answer choices (six of them are yes/no questions).
Sixteen of the questions have four answer choices.
Four of the questions have three answer choices.
Apart from yes/no questions, all questions have an
answerchoice,named‘‘Other:’’ If aparticipantcan-
not find an appropriate answer among dedicated
choices, he/she is expected to write his/her answer
there.
After designation of answer choices, Table 5 is
used to convert answer choices into numerical
values.
Some of the questions and their answer choices
are shown in Table 6. The weight values of
questions and the numerical values of answer
choices are also given in parenthesis. In questions
column, ‘‘p’’ in parenthesis means that the factor
affects the probability of infection and ‘‘c’’ in
parenthesis means that the factor affects the con-
sequences of infection. Note that, if the question
(factor) affects both parameters (probability
and consequences), then first numerical weight
value in next parenthesis is for the probability of




3 The factor is directly associated with a severe vulnerability and/or the factor is directly associated
with a critical asset and/or there is no countermeasure in place. Because of these reasons, the factor
is most effective factor that affects the probability of infection or the consequences of infection.
The factor contributes directly to the value of the risk parameter.
2 The factor is somewhat associated with a vulnerability and/or the factor is directly associated with an
important asset and/or there is a few countermeasure in place. Because of these reasons, the factor is
slightly/normally effective factor that affects the probability of infection or the consequences of
infection. The factor contributes somewhat directly to the value of the risk parameter.
1 The factor is a little associated with vulnerability and/or the factor is indirectly associated with an
important asset and/or there are enough countermeasures in place. Because of these reasons, the factor
is least effective factor that affects the probability of infection or the consequences of infection. The
factor contributes indirectly to the value of the risk parameter.




The type of attachment of e-mails 3
The number of e-mails per day 1
The number of different websites entered
per day
1
The source of floppies 2
The number of files downloaded per day 1
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infection and the other one is for the consequen-
ces of infection.
For a participant, more than one choice may be
applicable. In this case, the most effective choice
(the choice which has the largest numerical value)
is used during calculations.
Step-4: preparation of risk tables
Two risk tables are constructed for our case study
(one for the probability of infection parameter and
one for the consequences of infection parameter).
Each of the tables has five levels to represent the
level of risk parameter. These dynamic tables
scale the possible results of the surveys of the
fundamental risk parameters both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
For the probability of infection parameter,
there were 21 factors, so 21 survey questions are
applied. Until now, each of these questions was
weighted. Answer choices were designated to each
of these questions. Different number of answer
choices was designated for survey questions. For
each of the answer choices, numerical values
between 0 and 4 are determined.
To construct a risk table, firstly, minimum and
maximum numerical values that can be obtained
from the survey of risk parameter are found.
Formula (3) is applied in order to find the minimum
and maximum survey results of the probability of
infection parameter. For our case study, the value
of ‘‘i’’ is 21, ‘‘wi’’ is the weight of ‘‘ith’’ question,
and ‘‘pi’’ is the value of the answer choice for
question-i. Maximum value for a survey is found
out by assuming that a participant chooses the
most influential answer choice for all questions (so
that ‘‘pi’’ has its maximum possible value). In this
case, ‘‘maximum output’’ equals to 128.
Minimum value for a survey is found by assuming
that a participant chooses the least influential
answer choice for all the questions (so that ‘‘pi’’
has its maximum possible value). The ‘‘minimum
output’’ is 29 for our case study.
One hundred and twenty-eight points, which is
the maximum possible value for a survey result
present the highest probability of infection by
a virus. Twenty-nine points, which is the minimum
possible value for a survey result present the
lowest probability of infection by a virus. In
Table 7, the values between 29 and 128 are
arranged to represent risk levels. Possible survey
results presented in Table 7 are scaled and
matched to quantitative and qualitative values.
While building the risk table, the possible survey
values are grouped evenly and scaled to represent
the level of risk parameter. It may not be possible




The backup condition of files 3
The place of files 2
The importance of files in a computer 3
The dependence to files and applications 2
Table 4 Factors that affect both the probability and the consequences




The operating system of computer 3 3
The update against vulnerabilities 3 3
The type of user account 2 3
The frequency of update 1 2
Access to the shared folders of other computers 1 2








i : the number of the questions
w : the weight of the ith question
p : the value of the selected answer choice of the ith question
9=
; ð3Þ
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for all intervals to be divided evenly. In this case,
interval of excess should be assigned to the most
critical value. Table 7 is the risk table constructed
for the probability of infection parameter. In the
case study, the interval of ‘‘very high probability’’
is 20. The intervals of other four scales are 19.
The other risk table is for the consequences of
infection. The same calculations for maximum and
minimum values of survey output were made for
the consequences of infection variable during our
case study. To find these values, formula (4) is
used. This is the same as formula (3), except ‘‘j’’ is




4 Most effective answer choice. Affect enormously the probability of occurrence
or consequences of occurrence.
3 Rather effective answer choice. Affect highly the probability of occurrence or
consequences of occurrence.
2 Somewhat effective answer choice. Affect considerably the probability of
occurrence or consequences of occurrence.
1 Least effective answer choice. Affect slightly the probability of occurrence or
consequences of occurrence.
0 No effect on the probability of occurrence or consequences of occurrence.
Table 6 Some of the questions and their respective answer choices
Answer choices
Questions a b c d e
What do you do at
Internet? (p) (2)











More than 10 (4) 7e9 (3) 5e7 (2) Less than four (1) Other:



























Linux/Unix (0) Other: e e
In what account
do you use your
computer?
(p) (c) (2) (3)
Administrator/
root (4)





(p) (c) (3) (3)
No (4) Yes (0) e e e
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used to represent the questions of the consequen-
ces of occurrence parameter.
According to formula (4), ‘‘maximum output’’ is
found to be 160 and ‘‘minimum output’’ is calcu-
lated as 47.
Table 8 is constructed for the consequences of
infection parameter. For this risk table, interval of
excess is 26, which is for ‘‘very serious consequen-
ces’’. The interval values of other scales are all 21.
A final risk table, Table 9, is prepared by using
the fundamental risk formula. The final risk table
prevents confusions in the last step of ISRAM,
which is the assessment phase. This final risk table
is static. The uppermost row of the final risk table
shows the quantitative values of probability of
infection parameter. The leftmost column shows
the quantitative values of consequences of in-
fection parameter. The multiplication of these
two values according to formula (1) gives the
various risk values between 1 and 25.
The number of survey questions, the types of
questions and the structures of risk tables are
changeable according to the information security
problem. The flexibility of the method allows
ISRAM to apply to diverse information security
problems effectively.
To obtain consistent and accurate results from
a survey, it is important to carefully list the factors
and prepare the questions and answers. According
to the nature of problem, the number and type of
staff that participate in a survey may change. All
staff may participate in a survey that plans to
express the risk that arises from viruses.
Step-5: conduction of the survey
After preparation of risk tables for two risk
parameters and the final risk table, the survey is
ready for the distribution to the related staff.
Thus, the preparation phase of the survey process
is over. At Step-5, the survey questions are
distributed to the relevant staff as hard copy. In
our case study, one survey, which contains the
questions of both risk parameters are submitted to
the user. Twenty people participated in the survey.
Step-6: application of formula (2) and
obtaining a single risk value
After Step-5 is finished, formula (2) is applied. In
our case study, the probability for a computer to
be infected by a virus is found to be 3.8, which is
close to ‘‘high probability’’ at qualitative scale.
The consequence of a virus infection is found to be
4.05, which is approximately ‘‘serious consequen-
ces’’ at qualitative scale. As a result, the value of
risk is found to be 15.39, which is high level risk
according to the final risk table, Table 9.
Detailed survey results are given in Table 10. In
this table, the bulk survey results, simplified
survey results (after risk conversion tables) for all
participants, values of risk parameters and the
final risk value are given. The detail of application
of formula (2) is clearly seen in Table 10.
Step-7: assessment of the results
The most important output of ISRAM is the single risk
value obtained at Step-6. This risk value is obtained
after performing considerable amount of prelimi-
nary work including listing the factors, designat-
ing answer choices, weighting the factors, giving
numerical values to answer choices and preparing
risk tables. The quality of this preliminary work
definitely affects the accuracy of single risk value.






47e68 Negligible consequences 1
69e90 Minor consequences 2
90e111 Important consequences 3
112e133 Serious consequences 4
134e160 Very serious consequences 5






29e48 Very low probability 1
49e68 Low probability 2
69e88 Medium probability 3
89e108 High probability 4






j : the number of the question
w : the weight of the jth question
p : the value of the selected answer choice of the jth question
9=
; ð4Þ
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On the other hand, not only these calculations
and the final numerical result are considered but
also answers given for questions are examined in
detail by the risk analysts while assessing the
survey results.
By examining the answers to the survey ques-
tions in the case study, some important results
are obtained. Some of the users have adminis-
trative privileges while using their computers,
which increases both the probability and con-
sequences. USB storage devices and CD-ROMs
(not floppies) widely used in the network. Most
of the users do not backup their data. A small
group of the users download programs. Half of
the participants do not patch their computer.
This is a great vulnerability for virus infection. In
general, user security awareness should reduce
somewhat the probability and consequences of
infection.
The structure of ISRAM allows the gross risk and
net risk calculations. After user security awareness
program is held, the same survey is performed to
obtain the net risk value. In our case study, after
user security awareness program, risk value is
found to be 14.3, which is between medium and
high risk but very close to the high risk level.
The assessment of survey results is an important
part of ISRAM. Managers and staff can easily
Table 9 The final risk table prepared from risk tables (Tables 7 and 8)
Risk Z (1)! (2) 1: Very low 2: Low 3: Medium 4: High 5: Very high
1: Negligible 1: Very low 2: Very low 3: Very low 4: Low 5: Low
2: Minor 2: Very low 4: Low 6: Low 8: Medium 10: Medium
3: Important 3: Very low 6: Low 9: Medium 12: Medium 15: High
4: Serious 4: Low 8: Medium 12: Medium 16: High 20: Very high
5: Very serious 5: Low 10: Medium 15: High 20: Very high 25: Very high
Table 10 Survey results
Participant-m











wjpj where jZ 15
T2
Participant-1 94 4 103 3
Participant-2 100 4 124 4
Participant-3 74 3 95 3
Participant-4 73 3 112 4
Participant-5 110 5 121 4
Participant-6 97 4 113 4
Participant-7 89 4 129 4
Participant-8 88 3 118 4
Participant-9 99 4 105 3
Participant-10 85 3 135 5
Participant-11 93 4 136 5
Participant-12 124 5 156 5
Participant-13 69 3 98 3
Participant-14 95 4 123 4
Participant-15 96 4 145 5
Participant-16 90 4 119 4
Participant-17 118 5 135 5
Participant-18 71 3 129 4
Participant-19 94 4 113 4
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participate into this step like other steps and
express their opinions.
The survey results are assessed and suggestions
are put forward for the risk mitigation process.
The outcome of ISRAM is a risk report, which
clearly puts forward the survey results and as-
sesses these results.
Verification, comparison and the results
of the application
In order to verify the results of ISRAM case study,
we have gathered statistical data and run simula-
tion based on statistical data obtained. Arena
simulation software has been used to model the
risk environment and simulate on the real statis-
tical data.
By making analyses on the pilot network, it is
seen that, three main sources of virus are e-mails,
downloads and removable media (USB storage
devices, floppy diskettes and CD-ROMs). So, the
gathered statistical data are composed of the
number of received e-mails, downloads and stor-
age media usage per day, per computer and per
user basis. The statistical data were gathered for
one month. During this month, virus incidents were
carefully noted. The sources and number of in-
fections were written down.
After the completion of gathering of the statis-
tical data, three independent risk models were
constructed at Arena software because of the
independency of sources of data, which come to
computers.
In the risk models, generated data is repre-
sented by exponential probability distribution
function. Mean value of the probability distribu-
tion function was determined according to the
gathered statistical data for e-mail traffic, number
of downloads and storage media usage. The gen-
erated data were passed through the probability of
infection and the consequences of infection enti-
ties for all three risk models. The probability of
infection was constructed according to the
statistical data. Consequences of infection entities
were constructed after the discussion with
experts.
The gathered statistical data were imported
into the risk model and based upon the real
statistical data, Arena software simulated the
situation of the test network as if one year of
period had passed. Table 11 shows the final result
of this simulation.
The simulation results revealed the similar
results as ISRAM application. As it is seen in Table
11, there are a number of virus infections in one
year, which can correspond to the high level of
probability. Also, as it can be easily seen from the
last five rows of table, most of the infected viruses
have serious consequences. These two results are
compatible with the results obtained at the Step-6
of ISRAM. At Step-6 of ISRAM, formula (2) was
applied and single values for probability of in-
fection and consequences of infection were found.
The value for the first parameter was close to high
probability level and the value for the second
parameter was approximately equal to serious
consequences level.
‘‘As-if’’ analyses are also performed during
simulation. If the users perform updates and
backup operations, the probability and consequen-
ces of virus infections decrease dramatically. But it
Table 11 Simulation results
Risk report 1 Date: 17 May 2004
E-mail virus model Time: 2:34:51PM
Model parameter Average
Total e-mails 25342.1000
The number of e-mails that contain viruses 42.6000
The number of e-mails that contain viruses, which infect 32.5000
Total downloads 5245.1200
The number of downloads that contain viruses 12.0732
The number of downloads that contain viruses, which infect 10.0200
Total storage media usage 17445.3400
The number of storage media that contain viruses 8.334
The number of storage media that contain viruses, which infect 6.5300
The number of infections that cause very serious consequences 3.0000
The number of infections that cause serious consequences 19.0500
The number of infections that cause important consequences 5.0450
The number of infections that cause minor consequences 12.9550
The number of infections that cause negligible consequences 9.0000
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should not be expected from users to perform
these operations.
Consequently, the results of simulation based on
gathered statistical data are compatible with the
results of ISRAM case study. ISRAM gives the similar
results in a much shorter time period without
struggling with statistical data and by allowing
participation of staff.
An important advantage of ISRAM is its appro-
priateness to ALE calculations. In order to present
the survey result to the senior management, ALE
calculations can be performed. Some managers
may desire to see monetary losses rather then
single numerical values.
Calculation of ALE can be achieved as in
formula (5).
Annual Loss Expectancy
Z Threat Occurrence Rate per Year
! Single Loss Expectancy ð5Þ
where, the unit of Annual Loss Expectancy is
‘‘dollars per year’’. Similarly the unit of Single Loss
Expectancy is ‘‘dollars per worst case occur-
rence’’. ‘‘Threat Occurrence Rate per Year’’ can
be characterized as ‘‘the probability of virus
infection’’ and ‘‘Single Loss Expectancy e SLE’’
can be characterized as ‘‘the consequences of
virus infection’’
For ALE calculation, it is necessary to convert
the numerical values of two risk parameters to
threat occurrence per year and SLE values. In our
case study, the probability of virus infection was
found to be 3.8 e high probability, the conse-
quence of a virus infection was found to be 4.05 e
serious consequences. Risk analysts can convert
these results to ‘‘Threat Occurrence Rate per
Year’’ and ‘‘Single Loss Expectancy’’ values by
taking companies situation into consideration.
For our case study, ‘‘Threat Occurrence Rate per
Year’’ is designated as 50 occurrences per year and
‘‘Single Loss Expectancy’’ is designated as 40$.
Therefore, ALE is equal to 2000$. This is more than
the cost of an antivirus software package for an
institute. Thus, it is easily said that the lack of
antivirus software exposes high risk to institute.
Conclusion
In this study, a novel method, ISRAM, is proposed
for information security risk analysis. The pro-
posed method is based on a quantitative approach
that uses survey results to analyze information
security risks.
Quantitative tools included in ISRAM are simple
numbers related with the survey, risk tables,
addition, multiplication and division operations.
The main advantage of ISRAM over other risk
analysis methods is its ease of use. There are no
complicated mathematical and statistical instru-
ments in ISRAM.
Previously, it was mentioned that qualitative
methods might give subjective results. ISRAM is
a quantitative tool with well-defined steps and
mathematical measures. With a careful operation,
ISRAM gives objective risk results. The comparison
of the case study and simulation results proves this
statement.
Software-based risk analysis methods have a rigid
frame. During risk analyses in which software is
used, necessary variations may not be achieved.
This is not the case for ISRAM. ISRAM does not have
rigid frames. The number of questions and answer
choices, risk tables, weight values and the other
values may be changed from one analysis to
another. ISRAM has well-defined steps, and there-
fore it is deterministic. There is no risk of long
period of analysis like the paper-based methods.
Because ISRAM is a quantitative method which
does not contain complicated mathematical and
statistical instruments, manager and the staff may
effectively participate in the risk analysis process.
It is suggested that information security risk anal-
ysis should be more business oriented. Thus, less
technology and more culture and organization
should be used in order to succeed (McEvoy and
Whitcombe, 2002; Sommer, 1994; Reid and Floyd,
2001). ISRAM fulfills both the business and tech-
nology requirements by taking today’s needs into
consideration.
ISRAM may be used for a wide range of prob-
lems. From technical problems like the one in our
case study, to procedural and political issues like
to find out the risk arises from the weaknesses of
information security policies.
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